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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
A. H. HODGES,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Honorable Lewis Jones, District Judge

L. E. NELSON,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
A. H. HODGES,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.

CASE NO. 8018

EVANDER L. WAITE, also known as
E. L. WAITE
Defendant and Appellant

STATEMENT OF CASE
This action was filed in the District Court of Cache
County, by the plaip.tiff to recover damages from defendant as a result of a collision between the plaintiff's truck
and defendant's pickup truck and trailer, which occurred
on October 20, 1951, in Logan Canyon. A trial before
a jury resulted in a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $309.75
upon which judgment was entered by the trial court. The
defendant filed a motion for judgment nothwithstanding
the verdict, or in the alternative a motion for a new trial,
which was denied on April13, 1953.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This statement of facts is made for a more complete
understanding of the material facts omitted in appellant's
brief.
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The plaintiff, a resident of Smithfield, has been engaged in the trucking business since 1933, hauling flour,
mill feed and grain from Malad, Idaho, to towns in Western Wyoming via, Logan Canyon. On October 20, 1951,
plaintiff was returning through Logan Canyon from one of
his regular trips, and about 6:30p.m., and after dark, he
reached a point known as Temple Fork, about 17 miles
from Logan, and as he proceeded around a curve on the
highway he saw the defendant's horse and trailer about
40 or 50 feet ahead of him in the right hand lane of traffic.
( R. 41, 76). Plaintiff immediately applied the brakes on
his truck and swerved to the left in an attempt to avoid
a collision, but time and space would not permit, and
he collided with the left rear end of the defendant's trailer
and truck. ( R. 41, 78).
It was after dark and the defendant had stopped his
pickup truck and a cattle trailer attached thereto in the
right lane of traffic facing south on a curve in the highway
for the purpose of loading a horse in the trailer. ( R. 137).
The defendant had failed to post warning signals of any
kind to warn motorists that he had stopped his truck on
the highway at the place of the collision. ( R. 45). At the
time of the collision the defendant was loading the horse
in the trailer, and he jumped to the East to avoid being
struck. His son Jean was sitting in the seat behind the
wheel. After the collision both cars moved forward about
70 feet. (R 44, 45). When the cars stopped he and
plaintiff descended from their respective vehicles and
the defendant came down and joined them. ( R. 45).
The plaintiff said to both of them, "What were you
doing parked here?" And they replied, "We were loading
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a horse and we'd have been gone in just a minute. If we
had had another few seconds we would have been out of
your way." Plaintiff testified that immediately after the
accident he posted flares on the highway about 100 feet
above the curve to warn approaching traffic of the presence of the vehicles standing on the curve. ( R. 54 ) .
William A. Noble was called as a witness by plaintiff.
(R. 114). His deposition was taken on January 18, 1953,
( R. 114, 200) and admitted and read in evidence at trial
(R. 114). He and Lynn Hillyard were hunting deer
and were camped along the highway, a short distance
below the place where the collision occurred. They heard
the impact and came immediately to the place of the collision. (Tr. 201-204). He testified that it was after dark
when the accident occurred. The trucks were inter-locked
and facing down the canyon.
Upon further examination he testified:

Q. Do you know whether this accident occurred on a
straightaway or on a curve? A. It happned just around
the turn. Q. Around the curve? A. As near as I can remember. In other words, Alden's truck wouldn't have
seen the vehicle parked there until he had come almost
around the turn, giving him not much distance between
the two. Q. Now which lane of traffic were the vehicles
standing in? A. When I saw them they were both in the
right lane. ( R. 204).
ARGUMENT
Point 1. The verdict and judgment entered thereon
are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
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The testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses disclosed that the collision occurred on a curve in the highway) and defendant had parked his truck and trailer in
the right lane of traffic on a curve on the highway after
clark without posting flares or any light on the highway
to warn approaching traffic of the presence of his vehicles
on the highway. (R. 41, 45, 76).
The plaintiff testified that the accident occurred on a
curve and his testimony was corroborated by the testimony
of Highway Patrolman, Ed Pitcher, ( R. 101) who investigated the accident, and William A. Noble, who arrived
on the scene shortly after it occurred, and he testified that
the collision occurred "around the turn." ( R. 204).
The defendant and his son Jean attempted to show
that the accident occurred on the staightaway above the
curve, but just where thereon was not definitely fixed. If
this were true, then how did the vehicles stop 135 feet
south of the junction of the Temple Fork road, which
enters the main highway at the beginning of the curve?
Officer Pitcher testified to that. His measurement fixed
the location of both vehicles at 135 feet south of the
Temple Fork road and they were facing south. ( R. 101).
The jury,. no doubt, found and concluded that the
accident occurred on the curve as plaintiff and witness
Noble testified, ( 41, 76, 204) and also found that no
warning signals were posted by defendant. to warn the
plaintiff and other motorists of the presence of his vehicle
upon the highway.
Section 57-7-191, (b) Laws 1949, in force at that
time required defendant to display a red light visible from
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a distance of 500 feet to the rear. The substance of this
statute was given to the jury in instruction No. 4,
Point 2. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 5,
was properly denied.

It is submitted that defendant's request No.5, ( R. 11)
was properly denied by the Court. By the terms of this
request the jury would have been instructed to return a
verdict in favor of the defendant. In effect, defendant
was asking the court to completely ignore the testimony
of plaintiff and his witnesses. The Court did by its instructions fully instruct the jury on defendants theory as
reflected by the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses. (R. 7-10, 13, 14, 16).
Point 3. The Court properly denied defendant's motion for Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the
alternative motion for new trial.
Defendant contends that evidence produced by plaintiff established as a matter of law that plaintiff's contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
The trial court by its instruction number one submitted
this question to the jury. "Was the plaintiff negligent?"
The jury answered. "No." It is difficult to perceive how
defendant can make such a contention in view of the
positive answer of the jury. The instructions of the court
covered these issues, instruction 5 and 6. ( R. 16). So
that, the verdict of the jury based upon proper instructions
by the court, and on conflicting testimony is conclusive
upon defendant.
Appellant relies upon the following cases: Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 P. 304; Dalley vs.
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Midwestern Dairy Produce Co., 80 Utah 331, 15. P 2d.
300; Wright vs. Maynard, 235 P. 2d. 916, Pollard vs. Whitman 183 P. 2d. 175.
Nikoleropolous vs. Ramsey, 214 P. 304, is not in point
on the facts. At the time of and immediately prior to the
accident in that case, plaintiff was walking along the extreme right side of the paved highway. At that place
there was no sidewalks. The defendant's automobile approached plaintiff from the rear. It was raining, clear
vision was obscured. Defendant saw plaintiff when about
6 feet away, bul made no attempt to avoid the accident.
The plaintiff was lawfully on the highway. So the question
of contributory negligence was not under consideration.
The sole question devolved upon whether defendant was
negligent. This court held that he was.
In Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Company,
15 P. 2d. 309, the alleged accident occurred at night on a
straight level highway. The defendant's truck was parked
partially on highway and shoulder. It was an ordinary
summer night, and the weather was clear. There was
nothing to obstruct the driver's view as he approached the
truck The truck was not standing upon a curve.
The case of Wright vs. Maynard, (Utah) 235 P. 2d.
916, does not support defendant's contentions. At the
conclusion of the trial in that case on motion of plaintiff
the trial court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendant, thus holding as a matter of law that
defendant Maynard's alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, and instructed the jury to re-
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turn a verdict for the plaintiff. In the instant case, the
trial court submitted the case to the jury on both the
question of proximate cause and whether plaintiff was
guilty of negligence, and the jury found in favor of plaintiff on both propositions.
The citation to Shimizer vs. Kurtz 11 P. 2d. 1, is an
error, since the case is not reported in 11 P. 2d.
The facts and issues in the case of Pollard vs. Whitman
183 P 2d. 175, (Wash.) are entirely different from the
facts in the case at bar. The accident occurred at night
on a street in the city of Seattle. The defendant admitted
negligence but charged plaintiff with contributory negligence. The trial court ruled that he was free from negligence and directed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff
and determine the amount of damages. On appeal the
judgment was reversed and new trial granted, for the
reason that the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence
should have been submitted to the jury.
It is respectfully submitted that after the trial court
had submitted the issue between the parties to the jury
for their determination of the facts under proper instructions, that the verdict of the jury and judgment entered
thereon should stand.

In the case of Maragake's vs. United States, 172 F. 2d.
393, the Court in the course of the opinion observed that "The later Utah cases have rationalized the rule
to allow an area of discretion under conditions" suddenly and un-expectedly" arising within the clear
vision ahead, which with the exercise of due care the
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driver could not have avoided the collision. Trimble
vs. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 2d. 674.
See also West vs. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300,
17 P. 2d. 292; Nielsen vs. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401,
62 P. 2d. 117; Moss vs. Christensen-Gardner~ Inc., 98
Utah 253, 98 P. 2d. 363. The Trimble case, supra,
clarifies the rule by pointing out the various circumtances under which the negligence of a driver of an
automobile, charged with this standard of care, is a
question of fact and not of law."
The foregoing statement of law- as laid down in the
Trimble case, certainly is applicable to the situation which
suddenly confronted plaintiff when he first saw defendant's truck and trailer immediately in front of him on the
curve. Plaintiff's testimony is undisputed that he immediately turned his truck to the left to avoid the collision.
This was a question of fact and the jury had a right to, and
did, believe his testimony.
The following Utah cases have held that the rule
requiring a motorist to drive at such speed that the automobile may be stopped within the distance at which the
driver of the same is able to see objects upon the highway
in front of him - is a rule with some limitations and restrictions.
Moss vs. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 P 2d. 365;
Nielsen vs. Watanabe, 62 P. 2d. 117, Trimble vs. Union
Pacific, 142 P 2d. 674.
In the Moss case the facts are very similar to the case
at bar, and the rule there stateecl is applicable to the situation confronting the plaintiff as he proceeded around the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

curve in the instant case. ~lr. Justice :McDonough who
wrote the opinion, stated the rule which we contend is
applicable to the instant case in the following language:
"The complaint here questioned is silent as to
whether the highway near where the truck was parked
is straight or crooked, level, or otherwise. If the truck
could not, because of some obstruction, be seen as
plaintiff and her husband approached it prior to the
time they were blinded, and if plaintiff's husband was
driving at a lawful rate of speed an automobile properly equipped with lights and brakes without any
reason to believe the headlights of another automobile
would suddenly or unexpectedly blind him, that while
so blinded the collision occurred without time for hin1
to reduce his speed or stop his automobile, the rule
announced in the cases relied upon by defendant and
heretofore cited in this opinion would not apply.
Under such circumstances it may not be said that
plaintiff's husband was, as a matter of law, guilty of
contributory negligence."
In the Nielsen case, supra, the rule applied in the Moss
case, was followed and re-applied to the factual situation
confronting Mr. and Mrs. Neilsen immediately prior to
the collision of their car with the Watanabe truck which
was stopped on the highway. In that case this Court held
that Nielsen was not guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law:

"If the truck could not, because of some obstruction be seen as plaintiff and her husband approached
it prior to the time they were blinded, and if plaintiff's
husband was driving at a lawful rate of speed an automobile properly equipped with lights and brakes
without any reason to believe the headlights of another
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automobile would suddenly or unexpectedly blind
him, that while so blinded the collision occurred without time for him to reduce his speed or stop his automobile, the rule announced in the cases relied upon
by defendant and heretofore cited in this opinion
would not apply. Under such circumstances it may
not be said that plaintiff's husband was, as a matter
of law, guilty of contributory negligence. 3-4 Huddy
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th Ed. ) p. 59, sec.
30 and cases there cited."
The language of Mr. Justice Larson in the Trimble
case, supra, is definitely applicable to the factual situation
confronting plaintiff in the instant case immediately prior
to the collision:
.. Appellant argues that since defendant's bus
was moving at such a speed after entering the fog that
it could not be stopped within the driver's range of
vision, the driver, and his principles, the defendants
were guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Thus in
effect appellants ask this court to say that one driving
on a highway at night is bound to anticipate that there
will be fog, smoke, or some other obstruction which
will reduce the driver's vision, and that therefore all
must drive at such speed that should they meet with
such an obstruction they can stop their automobile
within the range of their vision as it is limited by this
obstruction. We do not believe this to be the correct
rule of law, or the situation to which the rule laid
down in the Dalley case, supra, was intended to
apply."
Respondent earnestly contends that the doctrine announced in the foregoing cases is determinative of the
issues involved in the case at bar. It is respectfully sub-
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mitted that the trial courts verdict and judgment entered
thereon is supported by a preponderance of the evidence,
and proper instructions, and is entitled to be affirmed,
together with respondent's costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,

L. E. NELSON,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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